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THE BEST OFFENSE IS A GOOD DEFENSE:
WHY CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS' NOLO CONTENDERE
PLEAS SHOULD BE INADMISSIBLE AGAINST THEM
WHEN THEY BECOME CIVIL PLAINTIFFS
Colin Miller
[N]o court to my knowledge has ever held a plea of nolo contendere to be
preclusive, at least in the absence of an explicit statutory provision.
We do not consider our decision to be barred by Fed. R. Evid. 410, which
provides that evidence of "a plea of nolo contendere" is not, "in any civil
or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the
plea." This case does not present the kind of situation contemplated by
Rule 410: the use of a nolo contendere plea against the pleader in a
subsequent civil or criminal action in which he is the defendant .... In
this case, on the other hand, the persons who entered prior no-contest
pleas are now plaintiffs in a civil action. Accordingly, use of the nocontest plea for estoppel purposes is not "against the defendant" within
the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 410. This use would be more accurately
characterized as "for" the benefit of the "new" civil defendant .... 2
Waitress:
Martin Blank:
Waitress:
Martin Blank:

What do you want in your omelette, sir?
Nothing in the omelette, nothing at all.
Well, that's not technically an omelette.
Look, I don't want to get into a semantic
argument; I just want the protein.3
When a defendant pleads nolo contendere or no contest, he does not
admit his guilt; instead, the plea is merely an indication that he will not
contest the charges brought against him. A principal purpose behind this
plea is to dampen the harsh repercussions of a guilty plea. When a
defendant pleads guilty in a criminal case, his plea can be used against
him in a subsequent civil or criminal proceeding. However, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 410, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
1 1(f), and most state codes, a defendant's nolo contendere plea in a
criminal case cannot be used against him in a subsequent proceeding
because the plea is not an explicit admission of guilt. Most frequently,
the defendant pleading nolo contendere in the original criminal trial

1. David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have a Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 32
(1984).
2. Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1988).
3. GROSSE POINTE BLANK (Hollywood Pictures 1997).
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remains the defendant in the subsequent proceeding, where the other
party seeks to introduce his plea, but there are exceptions. A relevant
example that will be highlighted in this article is a defendant pleading
nolo contendere to an arson-related crime who then becomes the
plaintiff in a civil suit against his insurance company, which refuses to
pay on his insurance policy covering the burned property.
All federal courts (and most state courts) agree that when the
defendant pleading nolo contendere at the original criminal trial remains
the defendant at a subsequent proceeding, his plea is inadmissible
against him. Conversely, courts are sharply divided over whether this
same criminal defendant would be entitled to the protection of the
Federal Rules (and corresponding state codes) if he became the plaintiff
in a subsequent civil proceeding. This split in authority is especially
relevant because some courts have held that nolo contendere pleas are
not only admissible in this scenario, but that they also have a preclusive
effect, estopping the (now) plaintiff from asserting his claim and thus
foreclosing the possibility of recovery.
Admittedly, the Federal Rules contain some ambiguity that lend
credence to either interpretation, assuming, that is, that one ignored the
1979 amendments to the Federal Rules.4 However, those considering
these amendments would find the conundrum resolved.5 The advisory
committee's notes to those amendments explain that the Federal Rules,
as then phrased, were being amended precisely because they could
support the incorrect conclusion that a criminal defendant pleading nolo
contendere could have his plea used against him in a subsequent
proceeding in which he became the plaintiff. This being the case, how
do we find ourselves in a situation where several federal courts as well
as state courts with evidence codes modeled after the Federal Rules
continue to support an interpretation of the Rules diametrically opposed
to the interpretation proffered in the advisory committee's notes?
This Article argues that courts holding that Federal Rule of Evidence
410, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (f), and corresponding state
codes do not protect civil plaintiffs who previously pleaded nolo
contendere are doing so based on blatant disregard for the 1979
amendments to the Federal Rules. Worse, as indicated by the second
quote opening this Article, even after ignoring these amendments, these
courts still arrive at this conclusion only by contorting the Rules until
their substantive protections are lost amid semantic gymnastics
4. See Olsen v. Correiro, No. 92-10961-PBS, 1994 WL 548111, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 26, 1994)
(noting Massachusetts' version of the Federal Rules contains some ambiguity but also stating that the
advisory committee's notes to the 1979 amendments conclusively resolve this ambiguity).
5. Id.
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employed for the specious argument that evidence introduced for the
benefit of one party is somehow not introduced against the other party.
Further, in creating this dichotomy, these courts create potentially
anomalous results such that attempts by non-pleading parties to admit
prior nolo contendere pleas for the same purpose are either covered or
not covered by the Rules based upon arbitrary reasons.
This Article thus argues that the status of the pleading party in a
subsequent proceeding should be irrelevant in determining the
admissibility of his nolo contendere plea. Part I provides a brief
introduction to nolo contendere pleas. Part II discusses why Federal
Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 (e)(6)
were amended in 1979. Part III analyses how the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Walker v. Schaeffer was
the first to hold that a nolo contendere plea could have a preclusive
effect on a subsequent civil proceeding brought by the pleading party. It
then proceeds to consider how a significant number of courts have
rubber stamped Schaeffer's holding regarding the potential preclusive
effect of nolo contendere pleas and applied it in a variety of factual
contexts. Finally, Part IV explains why Schaeffer's holding is inherently
inconsistent with the 1979 amendments to the Federal Rules and how
the attempts of Schaeffer and its progeny to explain away these
inconsistencies have been fallacious.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS

The Supreme Court has noted that "a guilty plea is an admission of all
the elements of a formal criminal charge .... " 6 Federal courts have
thus long held that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11,
they "'shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless [they are]
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea."' 7 Several courts hold
that a guilty plea in a criminal case has a preclusive effect, collaterally
estopping criminal defendants from relitigating in a subsequent case any
Collateral estoppel
issues necessarily determined by that plea. 8
precludes parties from relitigating issues they previously had a "'full and

6. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
7. Id. at 462 n.4 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11).
8. See. e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The district court
erred by not analyzing this admission and giving it preclusive effect."); Marinaccio v. Boardman, No.
1:02 CV 00831 NPM, 2005 WL 928631, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (internal citations omitted)
("[I]n New York, 'a guilty plea precludes relitigation in a subsequent civil action of all issues
necessarily determined by the conviction'. . . . Thus, for collateral estoppel purposes, 'a guilty plea is
equivalent to a conviction after trial[.]"').
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fair' opportunity to litigate," 9 and some courts hold that a party pleading
guilty had such a 'full and fair' opportunity to litigate his guilt.1 0
Alternatively, several courts hold that a defendant's guilty plea in a
criminal case can be introduced as substantive evidence against him in a
subsequent case but also note that the plea does not have a preclusive
effect. 1
Conversely, the nolo contendere plea allows a criminal defendant "to
avoid the collateral effect of a guilty plea .... ,2 A nolo contendere
plea is not an express admission of guilt by a defendant, but instead
serves "as a consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he
were guilty and a prayer for leniency."' 13 Because a nolo contendere
plea is not an admission of guilt, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
does not require courts to determine whether an adequate factual basis
supports a criminal defendant's nolo contendere plea. 14 For the same
reason, a nolo contendere plea is generally not admissible in a
subsequent proceeding involving the criminal defendant who made the
plea.15 Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, while felony
convictions resulting from guilty pleas are admissible as substantive
evidence as an exception to the rule against hearsay, 16 felony
convictions resulting from nolo contendere pleas are admissible only to

9. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979).
10. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
have concluded that Texas would most likely follow the rule that a valid guilty plea serves as a full and
fair litigation of the facts.., and thus that a Texas court would preclude Fullerton from contesting State
Farm's assertion that he acted intentionally.").
11. See id. at 380-81 (citing numerous court decisions from different states holding that guilty
pleas are admissible but not preclusive).
12. Refined Sugars, Inc. v. S. Commodity Corp., 709 F.Supp. 1117, 1120 (S.D. Fla. 1988); see
Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Mich. 1990) ("The primary purpose of a plea
of nolo contendere is to avoid future repercussions which would be caused by the admission of liability,
particularly the repercussions in potential future civil litigation.").
13. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 n.8 (1970).
14. Id. (construing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, advisory committee's notes to the 1979 amendments);
see FED. R. CRIM. P. I1, advisory committee's notes to the 1966 amendments ("For a variety of reasons
it is desirable in some cases to permit entry of judgment upon a plea of nolo contendere without inquiry
into the factual basis for the plea."). Some state codes do, however, require a factual basis for a nolo
contendere plea. See, e.g., Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, No. I:03CV57DAK, 2004 WL 724447, at *3 (D.
Utah March 5, 2004) (noting that the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require a court to find a factual
basis before accepting a nolo contendere plea).
15. See Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 59 (1stCir. 1999) ("The reasons behind.., making the
nolo plea inadmissible are readily apparent.").
16. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (holding that "[e]vidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial
or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year" is admissible as an exception to the rule
against hearsay).
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impeach the pleader in a subsequent proceeding.'
The exact origin of the nolo contendere plea is uncertain, but the
Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford noted that "[t]he plea may
have originated in the early medieval practice by which defendants
wishing to avoid imprisonment would seek to make an end of the matter
(finem facere) by offering to pay a sum of money to the king."' 8 The
partial basis for this conclusion was "[a]n early 15th-century case
[which] indicated that a defendant did not admit his guilt when he
sought such a compromise, but merely.. .'put himself on the grace of
our Lord, the King, and asked that he might be allowed to pay a fine
(petit se admittit per finem)."' 19 The nolo contendere plea has always
been recognized in federal courts in the United States. 20 These pleas
have often been criticized on logical and practical bases, 2 I but they
remain somewhat prevalent, with a 1997 study indicating that 11% of
state and 2% of federal defendants entered such pleas.22
In a recent article summarizing his interviews with "thirty-four
veteran prosecutors, judges, and public, and private defense lawyers,"
Professor Stephanos Bibas determined that the primary reason
defendants enter nolo contendere or Alforf 3 pleas is the fear of
embarrassment and shame associated with a classic guilty plea.2 4 While
defendants pleading nolo contendere are usually "guilty," "innocent
defendants [do] use these pleas infrequently"; Bibas provides the
example of a public defender estimating that he had seen between five to
25
ten innocent defendants using the plea in the preceding sixteen years.

17. See id; FED. R. EVID. 609.
18. 400 U.S. at 35 n.8 (citing 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
517 (2d ed. 1909)).
19. Id. (quoting Anon., Y.B. Hil., 9 Hen. 6, f. 59, pl. 8 (1431)).

20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1944 adoption (construing United
States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930) and Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926)).
21. See, e.g., id. ("While at times criticized as theoretically lacking in logical basis, experience
has shown that it performs a useful function from a practical standpoint."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory

committee's notes to the 1974 amendments ("[T]he desirability of the plea has been a subject of
disagreement."),
22. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1375 & nn.68-70 (2003)
(citing CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL

CASES 8 tbl.17 (2000), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc/pdf).
"[M]ost cases ... are
handled primarily at the state level." Id. at 1376.
23. "Frequently analogized to a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea often asserts innocence
whereas a nolo contendere plea refuses to admit guilt." Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 24 n. I (2d
Cir. 2004).
24. Bibas, supra note 22 at 1377. The second most prevalent reason is psychological denial. Id.
at 1378.
25. Id.
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Furthermore, a few of the defense lawyers Bibas interviewed indicated
that some defendants plead nolo contendere to charges for crimes more
serious than the ones they committed.2 6 The defense lawyers Bibas
interviewed categorically approved of the nolo contendere
plea while the
"prosecutors and judges [we]re more ambivalent." 27

II.

THE ORIGINAL FEDERAL RULES AND THE

1979 AMENDMENTS

A. The OriginalEnactment of
FederalRule of Evidence 410 and FederalRule ofEvidence 11(e)(6)
As noted, the nolo contendere plea has always been recognized in
federal courts in the United States,28 but the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure had no explicit provision rendering such pleas inadmissible in
subsequent actions when Congress enacted the Rules in 1946.29
Congress eventually added such a provision, but not until after it enacted
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 .30 Rule 410 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence codified common law precedent, which held that withdrawn
guilty pleas, pleas of nolo contendere, and offers to plead guilty and nolo
contendere were inadmissible against an accused. 31 "Rule 410 has
easily the most convoluted legislative history.. ." of any Federal Rule,32
but most of the Congressional battles over the Rule's content occurred
over impeachment and perjury-related issues and the issue of whether
statements made in connection with pleas and offers to plead should be
inadmissible, 33 and thus they do not need to be addressed here. What is
important is that Congress eventually enacted Federal Rule of Evidence
410 and then Federal Rule Criminal Procedure I1(e)(6) (which is now

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1379. Interestingly, Bibas himself strongly advocates against nolo contendere (and
Alford) pleas in his article. See id. at 1367 ("[L]egislatures should abolish... nolo contendere pleas.
Until they do so, prosecutors should oppose them, and judges should exercise their discretion to reject
them.").
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. See United States v. Cockrell, 353 F.Supp.2d 762, 767 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (indicating that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect in 1946); FED. R. CRiM, P. 11(f) advisory committee's
notes to the 1974 amendments (adding a provision making nolo contendere pleas inadmissible in
subsequent trials based on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence).
30. See Complaint of Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd., 85 F.3d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1996).
31. FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes to the 1979 amendments (construing cases
such as General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) and Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927)).
32. 23 CHARLES A LAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 5341 (1980).
33. Id.
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Rule 11(f)), which contained similar language and covered identical
ground.34 As enacted, Rule 1 l(e)(6) stated in relevant part that:
[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime
charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and
relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any
civil 3or5 criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or
offer.

Importantly, however, the Rules merely protect the defendant from
the admission of his nolo contendere plea. Conversely, the resulting
conviction is frequently admissible against the pleading party, typically
for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and
corresponding state codes. 36 State courts with evidence codes that differ
from the Federal Rules are split, with some allowing such convictions to
be used for impeachment purposes 37 and others holding that such
convictions are inadmissible to impeach.38
B. The 1979 Amendments to
FederalRule of Evidence 410 andFederalRule of Evidence 11(e) (6)
Congress amended the Federal Rules in 1979, primarily to clarify
exactly what evidence relating to the plea bargaining process is
34. Indeed, the current Rule 11(f) now simply refers to Rule 410. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
The Supreme Court never explained "[wlhy it was thought necessary to have two identical rules dealing
with the same subject.. Wright & Graham, supra note 32.
35. United States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137, 1138 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P.
I1(e)(6)).
36. See Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing precedent from the
Fifth and D.C. Circuits). "Rule 410, by its terms prohibits only evidence of pleas (including no contest
pleas) insofar as pleas constitute statements or admissions. Rule 609, by contrast, permits admission for
impeachment purposes of evidence of convictions." Id. This conclusion accords with the legislative
intent behind the Rules. A preliminary draft of"Rule 609 permitted the district court to admit 'evidence
that [a witness] has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere."' United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1070 (1983) (quoting Proposed Rule 609(a), 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (rev. draft
1971)). However, "[tihe exception for nolo [contendere] pleas was deleted from the Advisory
Committee's final draft and did not reappear." Id.
In some federal cases, a conviction resulting from a nolo contendere plea is admissible as substantive
evidence in a subsequent action. These cases "primarily involve statutes that attach some consequence
to the fact of a 'conviction."' Olson v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 568 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Pa. R. E. 410
cmt.) (noting how the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence contain a specific comment indicating that its
rule 410 "does not prohibit the use of a conviction that results from a plea of nolo contendere, as distinct
from the plea itself, to impeach in a later proceeding (subject to Pa. R. E. 609) ....
").
38. See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 611 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (construing People
v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 (I11.
1971)). Interestingly enough, the Illinois Supreme Court reached
this decision based upon the Proposed Rule 609 that was never adopted by Congress. Id.
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inadmissible. 39 The purpose of these amendments was to clarify the
term "against" in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6) and
Federal Rule of Evidence 410.40 The advisory committee described this
amendment as follows:
The phrase "in any civil or criminal proceeding" has been moved from its
present position, following the word "against," for purposes of clarity.
An ambiguity presently exists because the word "against" may be read as
referring either to the kind of proceeding in which the evidence is offered
or the purpose for which it is4 1offered. The change makes it clear that the
latter construction is correct.
As amended, Federal Rule of Evidence 41 0-the current Rule 11 (f)
now simply refers to Rule 410-now states in relevant part that evidence
of a nolo contendere plea, an offer to plead nolo contendere, and related
statements are "not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible
against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea
discussions.. ..,,42 Ostensibly, this amendment is a model of clarity. It
lays out a potential conflict in the pre-amendment Federal Rules and
then plainly states that the Federal Rules are being amended so that it is
clear which construction is correct.
Construction one is that the pre-amendment Federal Rules referred to
the kind of proceeding in which a party attempts to admit the plea or
offer.43 Under this reading, then, "in any civil or criminal proceeding
against the person who made the plea or offer," that plea or offer is
inadmissible.4 4 So, if a defendant pleads nolo contendere to arson, his
plea would then be inadmissible against him if: 1) the flames burned a
neighbor's property, and the neighbor sued the defendant for money
damages, or 2) after the arson trial, an individual burned by the flames
succumbs to his injuries and dies, and the defendant is sued by the state
for murder or manslaughter. Example one is a "civil... proceeding
against the person who made the plea," and example two is a "criminal

39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1I(e)(6) advisory committee's notes to 1979 amendment ("The major
objective of the amendment to rule 1l(e)(6) is to describe more precisely, consistent with the original
purpose of the provision, what evidence relating to pleas or plea discussions is inadmissible.").
40. See id. (discussing how the Rule was being amended "for purposes of clarity").
41. Id. The advisory committee's notes also state that "[n]o change is intended with respect to
provisions making evidence rules inapplicable in certain situations. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) and
1101(d)." These Rules address the fact that in deciding certain preliminary evidentiary questions, most
Federal Rules do not apply, and thus this portion of the amendment is irrelevant to this Article.
42. FED. R. EVID. 410. As noted previously, Rule 1 (f) now simply refers to Rule 410. See note
34 and accompanying text.
43. See id.
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, advisory committee notes to the 1975 amendments.
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proceeding against the person who made the plea ... "45 Conversely,
under this construction, if a defendant pleaded nolo contendere to arson,
the Federal Rules would not prohibit admission of his nolo contendere
plea if he subsequently sued his insurance company for failing to pay on
his insurance policy covering the burned property because this
subsequent case would not be a "proceeding against the person who
made the plea ....
Instead, it would be a proceeding for the benefit of
the person who made the plea (and against the insurance company).
Construction two is that the pre-amendment Federal Rules referred to
the purpose for which the plea or offer was used. Under this
construction, the nolo contendere plea would be inadmissible against the
person making the plea in all three of the above examples. While the
case in the third example would not be a "proceeding against the person
making the plea," the defendant-the insurance company-would be
seeking to use the plea against the pleading party to prove that he
maliciously set the fire, preventing him from recovering on his insurance
policy. Because the plea would thus be used against the pleading party,
it would be inadmissible. Conversely, if a prosecutor made some
statements favorable to the defendant during plea discussions, the
defendant could potentially introduce these statements in his favor at a
subsequent proceeding as evidence of his innocence because these
statements
would be used "'in favor of' the defendant," not against
47
him.
As noted, the advisory committee plainly stated that this "latter
construction is correct." 48 According to the advisory committee, the
word "against" in the pre-amendment Federal Rules referred to the
party's purpose in attempting to introduce the plea or offer to plead and
49
not to the type of proceeding in which the party sought to introduce it.

45. Id.
46. See id.

47. As the advisory committee noted, however, such favorable statements by prosecutors are not
"inevitably... admissible in the defendant's favor." FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6), advisory committee's
notes to 1979 amendment. Specifically, the advisory committee stated that it was not overruling
decisions such as United States v. Verdoon, where the Eighth Circuit essentially applied Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 to plea bargaining and held that "[m]eaningful dialogue between the parties would, as a
practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible
in evidence." 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976). However, while the Eighth Circuit has continued to
apply and even extend Verdoon's holding, most other circuits have declined to apply Rule 408 to the
plea bargaining process. Compare United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798-799 (8th Cir. 1993)
(applying Verdoon to bargaining over immunity agreements), with United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179,
180 (2nd Cir. 1991) ("The very existence of Rule 1I(e)(6) strongly supports the conclusion that Rule 408
applies only to civil matters.").
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(E)(6), advisory committee's notes to 1979 amendment.
49. See id.
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In essence, the advisory committee was stating that the pre-amendment
Rules should have indicated that a nolo contendere plea "is not
admissible, in any civil or criminal proceeding, against the person who
made the plea or offer." Without separating the clause "in any civil or
criminal proceeding" with commas, a court could interpret the Rule as
only applying in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person
who made the plea or offer (i.e., a proceeding where that person is the
defendant). Thus, the advisory committee separated this clause, and not
by merely employing commas, but by moving the entire clause so that it
came before the word "admissible."
Congress also implemented another amendment that is relevant to this
article. As noted, the Federal Rules only prevent the admission of pleas
and plea-related statements against the pleading party, so the pleading
party could admit favorable statements made by the prosecutor during
plea discussions.5 °
Congress thus added language to the Rules
indicating that statements made during plea discussions are "admissible
'in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the
same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement
ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it."' ' 5 1 The
advisory committee noted that this amendment was necessary so that
when a party is able to admit certain plea related statements, "other
statements relating to the same plea or plea discussions may also be
admitted when relevant to the matter at issue. 52 Thus, "if a defendant
upon a motion to dismiss a prosecution on some ground were able to
admit certain statements made in aborted plea discussions in his favor,
then other relevant statements made in the same plea discussions should
be admissible against the defendant
in the interest of determining the
53
truth of the matter at issue.,
The advisory committee noted that the rationale behind this
amendment was similar to the considerations involved in the "rule of
completeness" contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 106 and
corresponding state rules.54 Federal Rule of Evidence 106 states that
"[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by
a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it."' 55 The purpose
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CRiM. P. I1 (e)(6), advisory committee's notes to 1979 amendment.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 106.
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behind Federal Rule of Evidence 106 and corresponding state codes is to
prevent 56a party from transforming a legal protection "from a shield to a
sword.,
For instance, a defendant can frequently prevent the introduction of
an admission made by an alleged co-conspirator because its admission
would violate his Constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.57
If, however, the alleged co-conspirator made certain statements
favorable to the defendant in addition to the statements implicating the
defendant and himself, the defendant could potentially exclude these
latter statements while simultaneously introducing these former
statements as, inter alia, statements against interest. 58 Under the rule of
completeness, however, the defendant is prevented from first using the
Confrontation Clause as a shield, to prevent the admission of certain
statements, and then as a sword, to introduce related statements without
a complete factual context. 59 Thus, when a defendant uses plea related
statements as a sword, he forfeits any right to claim that the
Confrontation Clause serves as a shield to prohibit the introduction of
plea-related statements.60 Similarly, under the 1979 amendments, the
pleading party cannot subsequently use the Federal Rules as a sword, to
introduce plea-related statements that are favorable to him, and then as a
shield, to prevent the admission of other plea-related statements.
III.

THE SPLIT AMONG COURTS OVER WHETHER

NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS ARE ADMISSIBLE AGAINST CIVIL PLAINTIFFS

A. Walker v. Schaeffer and the PreclusiceEffect of
Nolo Contendere Pleas on Civil Plaintiffs
In 1984, Professor David L. Shapiro noted that "no court to [his]
knowledge ha[d] ever held a plea of nolo contendere to be preclusive, at
least in the absence of an explicit statutory provision." 61 A review of the
case law through 1984 reveals that Shapiro's belief was likely correct as
this author was unable to uncover any cases to that point in which a
court found that a defendant's nolo contendere plea was preclusive to a
claim made in a subsequent action. This would all change, however, in
1988, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
56. State v Prasertphong, 114 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2005).

57. See id. at 834.
58. See id.

59. See id. at 834-35.
60. Id.
61. Shapiro, supranote 1, at 32.
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became the first federal appellate court to address the issue.62 In Walker
v. Schaeffer, two individuals had been arrested for reckless driving and
They
disorderly conduct, and they pleaded nolo contendere.6 3
eventually appealed their convictions, but the Sixth Circuit was "not
64
advised whether the alleged appeal was pursued or of its outcome.
They also brought claims as plaintiffs against their arresting officers
"under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, detention, and imprisonment in
65
violation of their constitutional rights.,
The Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs had entered nolo contendere
pleas when they were defendants and offered the following question:
"Having voluntarily entered these pleas in state court and having been
found guilty of the charges against them, are plaintiffs now estopped
from seeking damages resting upon claims based upon alleged false
arrest and false imprisonment? ' '6 6 The court discussed the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, under which a party with a "'full and fair opportunity
to litigate"' an issue at an initial trial is precluded from relitigating that
issue at a subsequent trial.6 7 The court noted that the plaintiffs had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of their guilt when they were
defendants at their initial trial and concluded that their prior convictions
thus precluded them from relitigating the issue of whether they were
"falsely arrested and/or falsely imprisoned . ,68
Before concluding its opinion, however, the Sixth Circuit analyzed
whether the plaintiffs' previous nolo contendere pleas were inadmissible
based upon Federal Rule of Evidence 410. The court, however,
d[id] not consider [its] conclusion to be barred by Fed. R. Evid. 410,
which provides that evidence of "a plea of nolo contendere" is not, "in
any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who
made the plea." This case does not present the kind of situation
contemplated by Rule 410: the use of a nolo contendere plea against the
pleader in a subsequent civil or criminal action in which he is the
defendant .... In this case, on the other hand, the persons
who entered
69
prior no-contest pleas are now plaintiffs in a civil action.

62. See Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 302 (Mich. 1990) (Griffin, J.,

dissenting) (noting that the Sixth Circuit in Schaeffer was "the only federal appellate court to confront
this issue .... ).
63. 854 F.2d 138, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 140.
65. Id. at 139.
66. Id. at 142.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 143. The Sixth Circuit cited to United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1986), as a case where Federal Rule of Evidence 410 applied when the person pleading nolo contendere
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The Sixth Circuit asserted that "Rule 410 was intended to protect a
criminal defendant's use of the nolo contendere plea to defend himself
from future civil liability."70 The court noted that when the pleading
party becomes the plaintiff in a subsequent civil trial, he is attempting to
recover from a civil defendant and thus held that the plaintiffs prior
nolo contendere plea could be "interpreted to be an admission which
would preclude liability" on the part of the civil defendant. 71 In doing
so, the Sixth Circuit "decline[d] to interpret the rule so as to allow the
former defendants to use the plea offensively, in order to obtain
damages, after having admitted facts which would indicate no civil
liability on the part of the arresting police. 7
The court found that "use of the no-contest plea for estoppel purposes
is not 'against the defendant' within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 410.
This use would be more accurately characterized as 'for' the benefit of
the 'new' civil defendants ...
Under the court's analysis, there is
thus a dichotomy: when the pleading party remains the defendant in a
subsequent civil proceeding, and the civil plaintiff attempts to admit his
prior plea, the civil plaintiff is offering the plea against the pleading
party, rendering the plea inadmissible under the Rules. Conversely,
when the pleading party becomes the plaintiff in a subsequent civil
proceeding, and the civil defendant attempts to admit his prior plea, the
civil defendant is offering the plea for his own benefit, and is not
offering it against the pleading party, rendering the Federal Rules
inapplicable.
As should be evident from the Shapiro quotation opening this section,
Schaeffer was a landmark case, the first to hold that a defendant's nolo
contendere plea could be admitted against him as substantive evidence
in a subsequent civil case, precluding him from recovering damages.74
And yet, while the case certainly had an impact in subsequent federal
and state precedent,7 5 it has received scant attention in legal scholarship.
Beginning in 1991, the case has been consistently cited in the

remained the defendant in a subsequent criminal trial. The court, however, cited no precedent as support
for its position that Rule 410 was inapplicable when the person pleading nolo contendere became the
plaintiff in a subsequent trial. This makes sense, of course, because, as noted, Schaeffer was likely the
first case to so hold. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
70. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d at 143.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 302 (Mich. 1990) (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (noting how the Sixth Circuit was "the only federal appellate court to confront this issue..
.Sa).
75. See infra Part III.C-E.
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Georgetown Law Journal's Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, but
solely in a footnote as one of several cases holding that "the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel may also bar a section 1983
action. ' 7 6 In 1990, the case was briefly cited in an Indiana Law Journal
article at the end of a long footnote." Finally, the case was discussed in
a 1993 Connecticut Law Review article, but for reasons unrelated to
nolo contendere pleas and collateral estoppel.7 s
B. The MacGuffin of§ 1983:
Why Legal ScholarshipHas Ignored Schaeffer's Effect
The principal reason for the dearth of scholarship on Schaeffer as it
relates to the potential preclusive effects of nolo contendere pleas can
likely be found in how the case has been cited in the Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure. There, as noted, Schaeffer has been cited as
merely one of several cases standing for the proposition that some
§ 1983 claims can be precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Indeed, in this sense, Schaeffer was not a novel case. Eight years before
Schaeffer was decided, the Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry noted
that "every Court of Appeals that has squarely decided the question has
held that collateral estoppel applies when § 1983 plaintiffs attempt to
relitigate in federal court issues decided against them in state criminal
proceedings." 79 In fact, this is the same reasoning initially employed by
the Sixth Circuit in Schaeffer in holding that the plaintiffs in that case
from bringing their § 1983 claims based upon
were collaterally estopped
80
their prior convictions.
The Sixth Circuit in Schaeffer proceeded to deviate from this
precedent, however, when it subsequently attempted to consider whether
the plaintiffs' previous nolo contendere pleas were inadmissible based
upon Federal Rule of Evidence 410.81 Why the Sixth Circuit decided to
resolve this issue is unclear. All courts previously facing § 1983 claims
by convicted defendants merely held that their claims were precluded by
virtue of their prior convictions, not on the basis of their nolo contendere

76. See, e.g., 91 GEO. L.J. ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 929, 954 & n.2922

(2003).
77. See Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Administrative Decisionmaking
and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367, 381 n.77 (1990).
78. Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REV. 427, 455-458

(1993).
79. 449 U.S. 90, 102 (1980).
80. Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1988).
81. ld. at 143.
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(or guilty) pleas.8 2 Thus, the language in Schaeffer regarding the
admissibility of the plaintiffs' prior nolo contendere pleas was dicta,
which perhaps explains why legal scholarship has ignored this portion of
the decision and merely focused on the non-novel aspects of the
decision.83 Yet, while legal scholarship has ignored this aspect of the
Schaeffer decision, this Sixth Circuit opinion has had a wide ranging
impact outside the § 1983 context. And while, for the most part,
Scaheffer's holding remains irrelevant in the § 1983 context because it is
dicta, 84 it is enormously important outside the § 1983 context, where a
criminal conviction does not have a preclusive effect upon a subsequent
civil proceeding.
C. Schaeffer's Impact Within the Sixth Circuit
The Schaeffer case had an almost immediate impact on cases both at
the state and federal levels in the Sixth Circuit. Decided three months
after Schaeffer, Lichon v. American Universal Insurance Company
involved an insurance company refusing to allow its insured to recover
under his insurance policy after he was convicted of attempted burning
of insured premises after his nolo contendere plea.85 The state trial court
granted the insurance company's motion for summary disposition, and
the insured appealed to the Court of Appeals of Michigan on the ground
that his plea was inadmissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence 410,86
which mirrored pre-amendment Federal Rule of Evidence 410.87 The
court then noted that "[t]his provision could be interpreted to make
evidence of a nolo contendere plea inadmissible against the person who
made the plea in any proceeding by or against the person." 88 The court
found, however, that
this interpretation goes too far by allowing the use of the nolo contendere
plea not only as a shield, but as a sword. We favor an interpretation of

82. See, e.g., Martin v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 1164, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that § 1983
plaintiff was collaterally estopped based on his prior state court conviction).
83. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. Additionally, some courts in § 1983 cases
have noted the Sixth Circuit's holding regarding nolo contendere pleas, but simply disregarded it as
dicta. For instance, in Olson v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 62 n.12 (1st Cir. 1999), the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit found a § 1983 plaintiff's prior manslaughter conviction and sentence
precluded his claims and noted that its conclusion did "not rest on the analysis set forth in Walker v.
Schaeffer."
84. But see infra Part III.E.
85. 433 N.W.2d 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
86. See id. at 394-95.
87. Levin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 735 F.Supp. 236, 238 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
88. Lichon, 433 N.W.2d at 395.
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MRE 410 which would preclude the admission of evidence of a nolo
contendere plea in proceedings which are brought against the person who
89
made the plea, but not in proceedings which are brought by that person.
While the court thus primarily focused on the preclusive effect of the
insured's prior plea, it did also briefly state at the end of its opinion that
the insured's "conviction established [his] violation of his insurance
policy's exclusionary clause and bar[red] his recovery for the damage
which he caused." 90 Judge Sawyer dissented form the majority's
opinion, holding that "to allow a trial judge to use a plea of nolo
contendere in deciding a motion for summary disposition would, in fact,
make the use of a nolo contendere plea in a criminal case
meaningless." 91 Sawyer took
specific exception to the majority's observation that disallowing the use
of the nolo contendere plea in the case at bar would go "too far by
allowing the use of a nolo contendere plea not only as a shield, but as a
sword." The fact that plaintiff's nolo contendere plea may not be used to
establish the fact the he burned the property in question would not, as the
majority seems to imply, mandate plaintiffs recovery. Disallowing the
use of the nolo plea would not serve as a sword for plaintiff to enforce the
insurance contract. Rather, it is the majority's interpretation which would
turn the nolo contendere92plea into a sword-a sword for defendant to use
to run through plaintiff.
Sawyer also took offense to the majority's conclusion that Michigan
Rule of Evidence 410 applied only in "proceedings against the person
making the plea," instead concluding that it "applie[d] to any
proceeding, civil or criminal. 9 3 He finally noted that his reading of
Rule 410 did not bar the defendant from presenting evidence to establish
that the plaintiff attempted to bum his property; it merely precluded the
defendant from establishing this fact through the plaintiffs prior nolo
contendere plea. 94 Sawyer even acknowledged that it appeared likely
that the insurance company had a valid defense and noted that, unlike in
did not have to prove the insured's guilt
a criminal action, the company
95
beyond a reasonable doubt.

89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 396 (Sawyer, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. n. 1. Justice Sawyer did not, however, cite to the 1979 amendments to the Federal Rules

or the advisory committee's notes accompanying them.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Two years later, different judges of the Court of Appeals of Michigan
were presented with a similar factual scenario in Ramon v. Farm Bureau
Insurance Company.96 In Ramon, Steven Ramon put in a claim to his
insurance company for property that was burned in a fire, the company
denied his claim, and he sued it for breach of contract. 97 While that case
was pending, a prosecutor charged Steven Ramon with setting fire to
property with intent to burn and setting fire to property not a dwelling
with intent to defraud an insurance company. 98 During trial, Ramon
accepted the prosecutor's offer "to dismiss the pending charges and
allow [him] to plead nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of
attempting to obtain money under false pretenses less than $100." 99 In
the breach of contract action against the insurance company, the trial
court subsequently granted summary disposition in favor of the
company because Ramon's nolo contendere plea voided his insurance
contract. 100
The Court of Appeals reversed, "reject[ing] the rule set forth in the
majority opinion in Lichon," and specifically adopting Judge Sawyer's
"well-reasoned dissent." 10 1 The court essentially repeated the arguments
in Sawyer's dissent, noting that the insurance company could still prove
the plaintiffs culpability through other means, but holding that the trial
a sword that defeats
court's ruling was "tantamount to giving defendant
10 2
the very purpose of a nolo contendere plea." '
Later that year, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan was also presented with a similar factual scenario
in Levin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company.10 3 In Levin, Howard
Levin put in a claim to his insurance company for fire damage to his
home, the company denied his claim, and he sued it for breach of
contract. 10 4 In a related criminal action, Levin pleaded nolo contendere
to arson, and in the breach of contract action, the insurance company
sought to introduce his plea as part of its defense while the defendant
claimed that its admission was prohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence
410.105 The court mentioned the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Michigan in Lichon, but it found that it was not controlling because the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

457 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
735 F.Supp. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
Id. at 237.
Id.
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language in Michigan Rule of Evidence 410 was slightly different from
the language in the post-amendment version of Federal Rule of Evidence
410.106

The court, however, proceeded to cite to the 1979 amendments to the
07
Federal Rules and the accompanying advisory committee's notes.'
Based upon this citation, the court found that "the nature of the
subsequent proceeding (here, a civil action) and, impliedly, the status in
such subsequent proceeding, of the person offering the plea (i.e.
defendant or plaintiff) is immaterial" in determining whether a party's
prior nolo contendere plea can be used against him. 10 8 Nonetheless,
although the court found that Levin's prior nolo contendere plea should
not be admissible against him solely because he was a civil plaintiff, the
court, as a federal district court in the Sixth Circuit, was "constrained to
follow [the] contrary interpretation by the Sixth Circuit" in Walker v.
Schaeffer.'0 9 Therefore, despite disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit's
ruling, the court found that Levin's prior nolo contendere plea was
admissible against him. 10
Later that same year, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals of Michigan in Lichon v. American
Universal Insurance Company."' Relying upon Judge Sawyer's dissent
at the Court of Appeals level and the decision in Ramon specifically
adopting Sawyer's reasoning, the court reversed and held that Lichon's
nolo contendere plea was inadmissible against him in the breach of
contract action against his insurance company.' 1 2 As in Levin, the court
cited to the 1979 amendments to the Federal Rules and the
13
accompanying advisory committee's notes as support for its position."
Conversely, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Griffin noted that Michigan
Rule of Evidence 410 was modeled after the pre-amendment version of
Federal Rule of Evidence 410, making this subsequent legislative history
irrelevant.'14
In his dissent, Justice Griffin also noted that the public policy behind
the nolo contendere plea is to promote plea bargaining." 5 He found,
however, that "the promotion of plea bargaining is not a public interest
106. Id. at 238.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 239.
110. Id.
111. 459 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. 1990).
112. Id. at 295-97.
113. Id. at 296-97.
114. Id. at 301-02 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
115. Id.at 303.
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so overriding and paramount as to compel... a construction [of Rule
410] which actually aids the criminal defendant if he seeks to profit from
his crime."'1 16 Justice Griffin thus argued for an affirmance of the
decision of the Court of Appeals because he felt that the majority's
opinion would "make it easier for an arsonist to collect on his fire
insurance after he bums down his house or place of business." ' 17 He
instead favored an interpretation of Michigan Rule of Evidence 410
which prevented admission of a party's prior nolo contendere plea only
if that party remained the defendant in the subsequent civil
proceeding. " 8
In his majority opinion, Justice Archer countered that the dissent's
reading of Michigan Rule of Evidence 410 would "lead to nonsensical
results."' 19 By per se concluding that a civil plaintiff is not protected by
Rule 410, not only nolo contendere pleas but also withdrawn guilty pleas
20
(and offered guilty pleas that were rejected) would be admissible.'
Assuming slightly different facts, this interpretation could create the
paradoxical scenario: "For instance, if, instead of pleading nolo
contendere, Lichon made an offer to plead guilty that the prosecutor
his plea offer would be
rejected and Lichon was acquitted after a trial,
' 21
admissible under the dissent's interpretation."'
Archer also posited a situation where an insured suffers fire damage
to his property, puts in a claim to his insurance company, and the
company, unmindful of any bad faith on the part of the insured, pays
him policy proceeds.' 2 2 A prosecutor subsequently charges the insured
with arson, and the insured pleads nolo contendere. 123 As a result, the
insurance company brings a civil claim for restitution against the
insured. 124 Under the reasoning employed by the dissent (and the Sixth
Circuit in Schaeffer), the insured's prior nolo contendere plea would be
inadmissible in this civil action because it would be a proceeding against
the pleading party, who would remain the defendant. 125 This would be
an anomalous result because "the use to which the insurer wishes to put
the plea is indistinguishable from the use the trial court made of

116. Id.
117. Id. at 300.

118. Id. at302-303.
119. Id. at 296.
120. Id.
121.

Id. at 296-97.

122. Id. at 296.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Lichon's plea."'126 The only difference would be that the insurance
company in this hypothetical scenario was not initially aware of the
insured's arson, resulting in its awarding him policy proceeds.
The court noted that the Michigan Court of Appeals also determined
that Lichon's claim was precluded as a result of his conviction, as
opposed to his plea; 127 however, the court held that this determination
was fallacious as Michigan Rule of Evidence 803(22) (like its federal
counterpart) provides that convictions resulting from guilty pleas, but
not nolo contendere pleas, are admissible as exceptions to the rule
against hearsay. 128 Justice Archer did note that "[t]he public interest
might be served better by a rule that prevents an individual who pled
nolo contendere to criminal charges from excluding evidence of that
plea in an action in which the pleader seeks to establish some
entitlement arising out of the crime of which the pleader was
convicted."' 129 The court refused, however, to amend Michigan Rules of
Evidence 410 and 803(22) as written, instead finding that "[s]uch a
change in the law would be more properly accomplished through our
administrative powers to amend the Rules of Evidence, because the
administrative process gives us greater opportunity to deliberate the
effects of such
a change and to gather input from the public, the bench,
' 30
and the bar."'
This is in fact what transpired only one year later, as Michigan Rules
of Evidence 410 and 803(22) were both amended. 13 1 Initially, Rule 410
was amended so that it conformed "to the current version of its federal
counterpart."' 32 Now, as with Federal Rule of Evidence 410, Michigan
Rule of Evidence 410 reads in relevant part that nolo contendere pleas,
offers to plead nolo contendere, and related statements are "not, in any
civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions.'133 According to
the notes accompanying the amendment, this change "clarified the rule's
in Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co.,
original intent as explained
134
(1990).'
408
Mich
435

126. Id.
127. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
128. Lichon, 459 N.W.2d at 297.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131.

See MICH. R. EVID.410 (note to 1991 amendment).

132. Id.
133. MICH. R. EVID. 410.
134. MICH. R. EVID. 410 (note to 1991 amendment).
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It was also determined, however, that the public policy reasons cited
in Lichon were valid, resulting in a new exception to Michigan Rule of
Evidence 410 with "no federal counterpart. ' ' 135 As a result of this
exception, a nolo contendere plea is inadmissible in a subsequent
proceeding, "except that, to the extent that evidence of a guilty plea
would be admissible, evidence of a plea of nolo contendere to a criminal
charge may be admitted in a civil proceeding to support a defense
against a claim asserted by the person who entered the plea."' 13 6 Mich.
R. Evid. 803(22) was also amended so that a felony conviction resulting
from a guilty plea "(or upon a plea of nolo contendere if evidence of the
plea is not excluded by MRE 410)" is admissible as substantive evidence
as an exception to the rule against hearsay.' 37 The practical effect of this
amendment was to overrule the holding in Lichon (and the advisory
committee's notes to the 1979 amendments to the Federal Rules) so that,
for all intents and purposes, in a proceeding brought by a party who
previously pleaded nolo contendere, that party's plea and, if applicable,
the resulting felony conviction,
are admissible to the same extent as if
138
guilty.
pleaded
party
the
D. Schaeffer's Effect Outside the Sixth Circuit
While Michigan thus amended its rules to deviate from the Federal
Rules to achieve its public policy goals, courts outside the Sixth Circuit
generally have rubber stamped Schaeffer's unprecedented interpretation
of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 to reach similar results in a variety of
contexts. A few examples are representative.
In Brown v. Theos, Curtis Brown was convicted, upon a jury verdict,
of drug related offenses and, inter alia, sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment.' 39 Three attorneys represented Brown on direct appeal,
where the court upheld his conviction. 140
Brown then filed an
application for post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance
of his counsel, and the court granted his motion and ordered a new
trial.' 4 1 At the new trial, Brown pleaded nolo contendere to the charges
135. Id.
136. MICH. R. EVID. 410.

137. MICH. R. EVID. 803(22) (emphasis added); see MICH. R. EVID. 803(22) (note to 1991
amendment).
138. See MICH. R. EVID. 410 (note to 1991 amendment) (noting how the change "altered one of
the holdings in Lichon"); MICH. R. EVID. 803(22) (note to 1991 amendment) (same); Neshewat v.
Salem, 173 F.3d 357, 362 n.4 (6th Cir. 1999).
139. 550 S.E.2d 304 (S.C. 2001).
140. Id. at 305.
141. Id.
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and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. 42 Subsequently,
"Brown brought a legal malpractice action against [two of his attorneys]
alleging that but for their grossly negligent representation, he would
have fared better at trial and would not have been convicted through a
plea of [nolo contendere] or otherwise."'' 43 In relevant part, South
Carolina Rule of Evidence 410 mirrors post-amendment Federal Rule of
Evidence 410 in holding that a nolo contendere plea is "not, in any civil
or criminal proceeding, admissible against
the defendant who made the
144
plea."'
the
in
participant
a
was
or
plea
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the determination of
the Court of Appeals that Brown did not have a cause of action against
his attorneys because it found that "public policy [wa]s not offended by
forbidding a client from bringing a legal malpractice action against his
criminal attorney after the client ha[d] pled no contest to the charges. ' 4 5
The court interpreted South Carolina Rule of Evidence 410 as "not
contemplat[ing] the type of proceeding at issue in this case .... ,, 4 6 The
court noted that Brown, as the civil plaintiff, was attempting "to use his
no contest plea offensively for his own benefit."' 147 The court concluded
that South Carolina Rule of Evidence 410 "was never intended to cover
this type of case" and cited only Schaeffer as support for the argument
that "federal courts have found Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence does not bar use of pleas against
a defendant who becomes
148
plaintiff with respect to events in plea.'
In Rose v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, Arlen Rose was
employed at the defendant's tire plant, which had a "zero tolerance
policy toward illegal drug use." 14 9 Rose was arrested and pleaded nolo
contendere to possession of marijuana.' 50 The defendant then fired
Rose, who subsequently "sought and received an Order of Expungement
of the record of his no contest plea."' 5' Upon Rose's request, the
defendant granted him 52
a Fair Treatment Panel, which determined that
his firing was justified.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. S.C. R. OF EVID. 410; see FED. R. EVID. 410.
145.

Theos, 550 S.E.2d at 306-07.

146. Id. at 307 n.2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 219 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000).
150. Id.

151. Id. at 1219.
152. Id.
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Rose then brought wrongful discharge suit in federal district court
accompanied by a motion in limine seeking to exclude all evidence
relating to his nolo contendere plea. 153 The court denied his motion and
accordingly granted summary judgment to the defendant. 154 Upon his
subsequent appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found that Rose could not "affirmatively use the general rule
against admission of nolo contendere pleas to prevent [the defendant]
from introducing the' 155very evidence it relied upon in making the
termination decision."
The court noted that neither of the two primary reasons behind
excluding nolo contendere pleas in subsequent civil actions was
advanced by excluding Rose's nolo contendere plea. 156 The first reason
behind excluding nolo contendere pleas is to allow a criminal defendant
who would otherwise plead guilty to make such a plea, thereby
"prevent[ing] the plea from being used as an admission in a subsequent
civil action."' 57
The second reason "'is a desire to encourage
compromise resolution of criminal cases.' ' 158 The court determined that
"[b]oth of these reasons assume a situation in which the criminal
defendant is being sued in a later civil action, and the plea is offered as
proof of guilt.' ' 159 Citing Schaeffer, the court held that the defendant's
use of Rose's plea was not "against" Rose. 160 Instead, it was a
"defensive" use of the plea by a civil defendant as opposed to an
"offensive" use of the plea by a civil plaintiff. 161
In Oman v. Davis School District,162 the United States District Court
for the District of Utah was presented with a similar factual scenario. In
Oman, the defendant school district contacted the county attorney after it
discovered that Oman, an employee in its maintenance division, may
have been working for his own company "during his hours of
employment with the [d]istrict."' 163 The results of the subsequent
criminal investigation caused the district to suspend Oman, and he was
eventually charged with communications fraud. 164
' Subsequently, upon
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id. at 1220.
156. See id.
157. Id.

158. Id. (quoting Olson v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 1999)).
159. Id.
160. See id. (citing Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1988)).
161. See id.
162. No. 1:03CV57DAK, 2004 WL 724447 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2004).
163. Id. at*1.
164. See id.
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Oman's no contest plea and the results of the district's own
investigation, the district terminated his employment.1 65 Oman then
brought an action seeking to recover for, inter alia, breach of contract,
and the district brought a counterclaim for restitution. 66 Relying
extensively upon the Tenth Circuit's decision in Rose, the court found
that Oman's no contest plea was admissible against 67him to controvert his
"offensive" claims because he was a civil plaintiff. 1
Conversely, however, the court determined that the district could not
admit Oman's plea against him to prove its counterclaim for
restitution. 168 The court found that "the use of the plea itself in order to
prove the restitution counterclaim is asserting the plea 'against' the
defendant," and observed that the district could prove its counterclaim
without the use of the plea. 169 The court did note, however, that the
district could use Oman's plea to
prove its counterclaim "for
170
impeachment purposes, if necessary.''
Finally, in Pinney Dock & Transport Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp.,17 1 the
Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad (hereinafter "B & LE") and other
railroads, including Penn Central, were charged with a criminal violation
of the Sherman Act for their participation in a conspiracy. B & LE
72
pleaded nolo contendere and was subsequently convicted and fined.
Pinney, a private dock, and Litton a manufacturer or operator of selfloading vessels, claimed to be injured by the conspiracy and brought a
civil action against B & LE that was settled before trial.'
B & LE then
sought "contribution from
Penn Central toward the amount of these
74
settlement payments."'
Upon Penn Central's motion for summary judgment, the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the action, holding
that B & LE could not recover for contribution under Ohio law because
it was an intentional tortfeaser. 175 Relying upon Schaeffer, the court
held that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether B
& LE intentionally injured Pinney and Litton because its nolo
contendere plea "admitted the allegations in the indictment, at least to
165. Seeid. at*1-2.

166. See id. at *1.
167. See id. (construing Rose v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 219 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2000)).
168. See id. at *3.
169. Id.

170. Id.
171.

991 F. Supp. 908, 910 (N.D. Ohio 1998).

172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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the extent that it could not thereafter assert contrary civil claims."'' 76
These cases indicate how Schaeffer's novel holding has been applied
beyond the § 1983 context to a variety of new contexts such as actions
for insurance proceeds, malpractice, wrongful termination, and
contribution. While Schaeffer's holding regarding nolo contendere pleas
was merely dicta, courts are nevertheless relying upon Schaeffer's
holding as the sole basis for their decisions in non-§ 1983 cases, where
criminal convictions are not preclusive with regard to subsequent civil
proceedings. Notably, however, even in the § 1983 context, a
significant subset of cases remains in which Schaeffer's holding
regarding nolo contendere pleas is not dicta.
E. Heck v. Humphrey and Schaeffer's ContinuingEffect in
§ 1983 Jurisprudence
As noted previously, well before Schaeffer, consensus existed among
courts that "collateral estoppel applies when § 1983 plaintiffs attempt to
relitigate in federal court issues decided against them in state criminal
proceedings." 177 In this sense, § 1983 actions by plaintiffs previously
convicted upon nolo contendere pleas are precluded on the basis of their
prior convictions, so Schaeffer's holding regarding the admissibility of
their pleas is irrelevant because collateral estoppel applies regardless of
whether their pleas are admissible.178 In Heck v. Humphrey,179 however,
the Supreme Court clarified § 1983 jurisprudence in a way that made the
issue of the admissibility of nolo contendere pleas relevant in a
significant subset of § 1983 cases.
The Court in Heck tweaked prior precedent by noting that a valid
conviction precludes a § 1983 plaintiff from recovering "damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid. . . .""0 Thus, for instance, a defendant convicted of
resisting arrest-defined as "intentionally preventing a peace officer
from effecting a lawful arrest"-could not subsequently bring a § 1983
claim seeking "damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable seizures."' 181 The criminal defendant could
176. Id. at 911 (construing Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1988)). The court went on
to note that under Schaeffer, "B & LE's felony conviction is admissible in this action, and establishes
that B & LE criminally violated the antitrust laws by engaging in the Iron Ore Conspiracy." Id. at 912.
177. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102 (1980).
178. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
179. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
180. Id. at 486.
181.

Id. at 486 n.6.
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not bring this claim because resisting arrest is "defined as intentionally
preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful arrest," and were the
§ 1983 claim successful, the conviction would be
invalid because the
82
defendant would not have been lawfully arrested. 1
The Court, however, was quick to note that when a "court determines
that the plaintiffs action even if successful, will not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the
action should be allowed to proceed.... ."8 3 The Court provided the
example of a convicted defendant subsequently bringing a § 1983 claim
seeking compensatory damages for an unreasonable search. 8 4 Were the
§ 1983 plaintiff to recover on such a claim it "would not necessarily
imply that the plaintiffs conviction was unlawful ... [b]ecause of
doctrines like independent1 source and inevitable discovery..., and
especially harmless error." 85
One result of this example employed by the Court in Heck has been
that courts have considered the issue of whether a § 1983 claim based
upon excessive force by arresting officers is precluded when the § 1983
plaintiff was previously convicted of resisting arrest. 186 In Douglas v.

182. See id.
183. Id. at 487.
184. Id. at 487 n.7.
185. Id. (internal citations omitted). The Heck decision is thus somewhat enigmatic. A § 1983
plaintiff can recover compensatory damages for constitutional violations, but only if these violations
would not invalidate his conviction. Thus, if the prosecution presents overwhelming evidence of a
defendant's guilt at trial, that defendant could subsequently recover as a § 1983 plaintiff by proving that
he suffered injuries during an illegal search because the court's failure to exclude evidence from that
search would be harmless error. However, if the primary or sole evidence introduced against a
defendant against trial comes from an allegedly illegal search, that defendant could subsequently recover
as a § 1983 plaintiff for injuries suffered during that search because his success would not render his
conviction invalid.
This somewhat paradoxical holding by the Supreme Court understandably has led to some
interesting circuit splits. One circuit split directly addresses the unreasonable search example raised by
the Court. As noted in a few law review articles, some circuits construe Heck as holding that a
convicted defendant can bring a § 1983 claim based upon an unreasonable search without the prior
reversal of his conviction or the ruling admitting evidence obtained from that search while others require
such reversal. See Paul D. Vink, Note, The Emergence of Divergence: The FederalCourt's Struggle to
Apply Heck v. Humphrey to § 1983 Claims for Illegal Searches, 35 IND. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2002)
(contrasting the approaches of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with the approaches of the
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); John Stanfield Buford, When the Heck Does This Claim
Accrue? Heck v. Humphrey's Footnote Seven and § 1983 Damages Suits for Illegal Search and
Seizure, 58 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1493, 1510-1532 (2001) (same).
186. As in the unreasonable search context discussed in the previous footnote, courts have sharply
divided over this issue. See Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction
Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 605 n.98 (2004) (discussing Smithart and excessive
force claims); Vink, supra note 185 at 1089(arguing that excessive force claims are prohibited under
Heck); Buford, supra note 185 at 1519-20 & n. 158 (discussing excessive force claims).
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Public Safety Comm'n, 187 the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware was presented with a § 1983 excessive force claim
by a prior criminal defendant (Douglas) who had pleaded nolo
contendere to resisting arrest in a state criminal court proceeding. The
defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the
claim against them. 188 Before addressing the substance of Douglas's
claims, the court construed Schaeffer as holding that Federal Rule of
Evidence 410 "contemplates a situation where the nolo contendere plea
is being used against the pleader in a subsequent civil or criminal action
in which he is the defendant."' 89 The court adopted this view and thus
found that Douglas' prior nolo contendere plea was admissible.' 90 The
court went on to state, however, that regardless of Schaeffer, under
Heck, to the extent that Douglas' recovery on his § 1983 claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his state court conviction, he was
precluded from bringing his claim. 19 1
Before dismissing the § 1983 claim, however, the court noted that
Douglas did not indicate whether he was challenging the fact that he
resisted arrest or whether he was arguing "that he was, in fact, resisting
arrest, but that [the police officer's] use of force was nevertheless
excessive ....
Assuming that the plaintiff intended to make the
latter argument, it found that his claim was not precluded based under
Heck because his recovery on his § 1983 claim would not invalidate his
conviction for resisting arrest. 193
Douglas thus illustrates why Schaeffer's holding is relevant and not
merely dicta in a significant subset of § 1983 cases. In any case where a
plaintiff who previously pleaded nolo contendere brings a § 1983 claim
which, if successful, would not invalidate his state criminal court
conviction, Heck is inapplicable; the § 1983 plaintiffs prior conviction
is not preclusive; and the court must decide whether his prior nolo
contendere plea is admissible. Courts such as the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, which rely upon Schaeffer, will hold
that such pleas are admissible. The question thus becomes whether
these courts and courts in the non-§ 1983 context are correct in their
analysis.

187. No. Civ.A. 01-149 GMS, 2002 WL 31050863 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 2002).

188. Id. at *1.
189. Id. at *8 (construing Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1988)).
190. See id.
191. See id.

192. Id. at *8
193. Id.
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IV. RESOLVING THE SPLIT
A. Why the Type of Proceedingis Irrelevant Under the FederalRules
In Walker v. Schaeffer, the Sixth Circuit essentially engaged in a two
prong analysis to explain why, in its view, Federal Rule of Evidence 410
does not apply when a criminal defendant who pleaded nolo contendere
subsequently becomes a civil plaintiff. Its first line of attack was to
argue that a case in which the pleading party becomes a civil plaintiff
"does not present the kind of situation contemplated by Rule 410: the
use of a nolo contendere plea against the pleader in a subsequent civil or
criminal action in which he is the defendant."'194 Several courts have
followed Schaeffer's lead in holding that such a case is not the kind of
proceeding contemplated
by Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and its state
95
counterparts. 1
As noted, however, when the Federal Rules were amended in 1979,
the advisory committee noted that they were being reworded precisely 1to96
avoid the exact conclusion drawn by Schaeffer and its progeny.
According to the advisory committee, the word "against" in the preamendment Federal Rules was ambiguous because it could have been
"read as referring either to the kind of proceeding in which the [plearelated] evidence is offered or the purpose for which it is offered.', 19 7 In
amending the Federal Rules, the advisory committee "ma[de] it clear
that the latter construction [wa]s correct."' 198 The Sixth Circuit in
Schaffer held that a case where a criminal defendant becomes a civil
plaintiff is not "the kind of situation contemplated by Rule 410," but the
advisory committee's notes clearly indicate that such a situation was in
fact contemplated and to such an extent that the Federal Rules were
amended so that there could be no ambiguity about the issue. 199 It is
thus clear that Schaeffer's ruling that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 is
per se inapplicable unless there is a "subsequent civil or criminal action
in which [the pleader] is the defendant" contradicts the advisory
committee's plainly stated intent behind the 1979 amendments that the
word "against" does not refer to the kind of proceeding.20 0 The second

194. Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1988).
195. See, e.g., Brown v. Theos, 550 S.E.2d 304, 307 n.2 (S.C. 2001) (holding that S.C. R. EVID.

410 did "not contemplate the type of proceeding at issue in this case").
196. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

197. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6), advisory committee's notes to 1979 amendment.
198. Id.
199. Id.Schaeffer, 854 F2d at 143
200. Id.
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prong of the Sixth Circuit's analysis, however, requires further
discussion.
B. An Admission By Any Other Name:
The Semantic Gymnastics of Walker v. Schaeffer
As noted previously, although the Sixth Circuit in Schaeffer held that
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 is per se inapplicable unless there is a
"subsequent civil or criminal action in which [the pleader] is the
defendant," it also proceeded to consider the purpose for which a nolo
contendere plea is offered in a case where the pleading party becomes a
civil plaintiff.20 1 According to the court, when a criminal defendant
becomes a civil defendant and the civil plaintiff attempts to introduce
the defendant's prior nolo contendere plea, the civil plaintiff is using the
plea against the civil defendant, rendering the plea inadmissible under
the Federal Rules.20 2 Conversely, when a criminal defendant becomes a
civil plaintiff and the civil defendant attempts to introduce the civil
plaintiffs prior nolo contendere plea, the civil defendant is using the
pleafor his own benefit, and not againstthe civil plaintiff, rendering the
Federal Rules inapplicable and making the plea "an admission which
20 3
would preclude liability.
Initially, this reading of the Federal Rules improperly renders the
advisory committee's notes to the 1979 amendments a nullity. Those
notes clearly indicate the Federal Rules were being amended to resolve
an existing ambiguity and make clear that the word "against" did not
refer to the kind of proceeding at issue but instead the purpose for which
the plea was offered. While the Sixth Circuit ostensibly focused part of
its decision in Schaeffer on the purpose for which a nolo contendere plea
is offered in determining admissibility, under its holding, unless the kind
of proceeding involved is a proceeding in which the pleading party
becomes the civil defendant-a proceeding "against" the pleading
party-the protections of the Federal Rules do not apply. Furthermore,
even were one to take a leap of faith and acquiesce to the Sixth Circuit's
semantic gymnastics, a larger problem precludes the court's conclusion.
According to the Sixth Circuit, a nolo contendere plea cannot be
offered against a civil plaintiff, so a civil defendant can introduce a civil
20 4
plaintiffs prior nolo contendere plea into evidence as an admission.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2) and most corresponding state
201.

Id.

202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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codes,20 5 however, an admission is defined as a statement fulfilling two
requirements.2 °6 One requirement is that the statement must be, inter
alia, made or adopted by a party-opponent.0 7 The other requirement is
,208
that "[t]he statement is offered againsta party ....
This definition illustrates the fallacy in the Sixth Circuit's reasoning.
According to the Sixth Circuit, a nolo contendere plea is not offered
against the pleader when he becomes a civil plaintiff, and the plea is
thus not covered by the Federal Rules. 20 9 Because the plea thus
constitutes an admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), the
civil defendant can introduce it into evidence. 2 10 However, under that
same Federal Rule, an admission must be offered against a party, and
thus to the extent that the Sixth Circuit and courts following its lead
hold that a nolo contendere plea is not offered against the civil plaintiff,
it cannot constitute an admission. 2 11 If a nolo contendere plea is not an
admission under these circumstances, the question then becomes
whether any other grounds permit it to be admitted.
C. Why Civil Plaintiffs Seeking to Exclude PriorNolo Contendere Pleas
Are Not Using the FederalRules as a Shield and a Sword
While neither of Schaeffer's two prongs was sufficient to defeat the
clear legislative intent contained in the advisory committee's notes to the
1979 amendments to the Federal Rules, the Sixth Circuit also advanced
a public policy argument. Simply put, the court stated that regardless of
the language of the Federal Rules, it "decline[d] to interpret the rule so
as to allow the former defendants to use the plea offensively, in order to
obtain damages, after having admitted facts which would indicate no
civil liability on the part of the [civil defendant(s)]. 2 12 Courts citing to
Schaeffer in subsequent cases have interpreted this language in two
ways.
In Lichon v. American Universal Insurance Company, the Court of
Appeals of Michigan held that reading Michigan Rule of Evidence 410
"to make evidence of a nolo contendere plea inadmissible against the
person who made the plea in any proceeding by or against the

205.

See, e.g., S.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).

206. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
207. See id.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. See Schaeffer, 854 F.2d at 143.
210. See id.
211.

See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).

212. See Schaeffer, 854 F.2d at 143.
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person... allow[ed] the use of the nolo contendere plea not only as a
shield, but as a sword., 2 13 The courts in both Schaeffer and Lichon seem
to be missing the point, however, that a civil plaintiff attempting to have
evidence of his nolo contendere plea excluded in no way uses his plea
either offensively or as a sword, a point made evident by reconsidering
"shield and sword" jurisprudence.
When courts refer to a party attempting to use safeguards as both a
shield and a sword, they are referring to one factual scenario: a party
attempting to admit certain evidence while using safeguards to prevent
the admission of other evidence that puts the admitted evidence into
context. For this reason, the rule in such cases is sometimes referred to
as the "rule of completeness": the court holds that the partial evidence
submitted by the party cannot be understood without viewing the
complete factual scenario surrounding it. 2 14 As noted previously, the
1979 amendments to the Federal Rules created a separate rule for just
such a situation in the plea bargaining context. 2 15 Thus, when there are
aborted plea discussions and the criminal defendant is subsequently able
to admit certain statements made during those discussions (because they
are not statements made "against" him), "then other relevant statements
made in the same plea discussions should be admissible against the
defendant in the interest of determining the truth of the matter at
issue. 2 16
This situation presents the classic "shield and sword" case as a party
attempts to use the Federal Rules (or accompanying state codes) as a
sword-to admit plea related statements favorable to him and as a
shield-to prevent the admission of plea related statements against him.
Conversely, in the case where a civil plaintiff seeks to exclude the
admission of his prior nolo contendere plea, he is using the Federal
Rules solely as a shield. He seeks only to have the plea excluded and
does not attempt to selectively introduce certain statements relating to
that plea. The "rule of completeness" cannot apply because there is
nothing to complete. The criminal defendant in this scenario may now
be making an offensive claim against a civil defendant, but he in no way
uses his plea offensively in order to recover.
In fact, as a few courts have noted after Schaeffer, in this scenario, it
is the civil defendant attempting to use the plea as a sword in a way that
defeats the very purpose of nolo contendere pleas: preventing their

213. 433 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
214. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (e)(6), advisory committee's notes to 1979 amendment.
215. See id.
216. See id; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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admission in subsequent civil proceedings.2 1 7 It also should be noted
that taking this "sword" away from the civil defendant does not prevent
it from rebutting the civil plaintiffs claims; it merely forces the civil
defendant to use evidence other than the nolo contendere plea to prove
the civil plaintiffs guilt as it would have to do if there were no criminal
trial. In his dissent in Lichon v. American Universal Insurance
Company, for instance, Justice Archer acknowledged that even if the
court excluded the civil plaintiffs nolo contendere plea, the insurance
company could likely mount a valid defense and noted that, unlike in a
criminal action, the company would not need to prove the insured's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 18
Other courts have interpreted Schaeffer's language as holding that
allowing civil plaintiffs to prevent the admission of their prior nolo
contendere pleas defeats the purposes behind excluding nolo contendere
pleas in subsequent civil proceedings. 2 19 Thus, for instance, in Rose v.
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit indicated that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 is in
place, first, to allow a criminal defendant who would otherwise plead
guilty to make such a plea and "to prevent the plea from being used as
an admission in a subsequent civil action," and second, "'to encourage
compromise resolution of criminal cases."' 220 The court then concluded
that "[b]oth of these reasons assume a situation in which the criminal
defendant is being
sued in a later civil action, and the plea is offered as
221
proof of guilt."
The Tenth Circuit's belief about the type of situation assumed by the
Federal Rules is plainly contradicted by the advisory committee's notes
to the 1979 amendments, which indicate, that the Rules do not apply
solely to the "kind of proceeding" in which the pleading party is now a
civil defendant. 22 2 Regardless of these notes, however, the Tenth
Circuit's proffered analysis is specious. Under an interpretation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 that allows this defendant to exclude his
plea from any subsequent civil proceeding as an admission, the two
purposes behind the Rule are broadly achieved. The criminal defendant
knows that in any subsequent civil proceeding, his plea cannot be used
against him, and he is thus more likely to reach a compromise resolution
of his case.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See, e.g., Ramon v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
See Lichon, 433 N.W.2d at 395.
See Rose v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 219 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1I(e)(6) advisory committee's notes to 1979 amendment.
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Conversely, under Schaeffer's interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 410, in which the Rule is inapplicable in cases where the
pleading party becomes a civil plaintiff, the two purposes behind the
Rule are more narrowly achieved. The criminal defendant knows that in
any subsequent civil action in which he is the plaintiff, his plea can
be used against him, and he is thus less likely to reach a compromise
resolution of his case if there is a possibility he might bring a subsequent
civil action.
D. Why Other Public Policy Concerns
Do Not Justify Amending the Rules
Perhaps, one might argue, there is some other public interest that
outweighs the public interest in promoting plea bargaining.
For
instance, in his dissent in Lichon v. American Universal Insurance
Company, Justice Griffin noted that "the promotion of plea bargaining is
not a public interest so overriding and paramount as to compel ...a
construction [of Rule 410] which actually aids the criminal defendant if
he seeks to profit from his crime. 223 As the majority in that case noted,
however, the Sixth Circuit's construction of Federal Rule of Evidence
410 in Schaeffer does not always hinder a criminal defendant from
profiting and can lead to anomalous results.22 4
In Lichon, a civil plaintiff who had previously pleaded nolo
contendere to attempted burning brought an action against his insurance
company, which refused to pay on his policy covering the burned
property.
The majority cited the counter-example of an insured
suffering fire damage to his property, recovering from his insurance
company, and only then being charged with arson and pleading nolo
contendere.2 25 In such a case the pleading party would be the civil
defendant if the insurance company brought an action for restitution, and
his plea would be inadmissible under Schaeffer even though the
insurance company would be using
the plea for the same purpose as was
226
the insurance company in Lichon.
Several similar factual scenarios exist in which similarly anomalous
results could occur, including almost any case involving a settlement.
Thus, in any breach of contract action, the parties might consider settling
their dispute. In scenario one, the allegedly non-breaching party brings
an action for breach of contract against the allegedly breaching party, the
223. 459 N.W.2d 288, 303 (Mich. 1990).
224. See id at 296.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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parties fail to settle, the allegedly non-breaching party is then charged
with a crime such as criminal fraud for activities relating to the contract,
and he pleads nolo contendere before the civil action is resolved. Under
Schaeffer, his plea could be used against him in the subsequent breach of
contract action because he would be the civil plaintiff.
In scenario two, the parties do settle the breach of contract action, or
the court finds that there was a breach of contract. Subsequently, the
allegedly non-breaching party is charged with criminal fraud and pleads
nolo contendere, and the allegedly breaching party brings an action to
invalidate the settlement. Under Schaeffer, however, because the
pleading party would be the civil defendant in this case, his plea would
be inadmissible even though the allegedly breaching party would be
using it for the same purpose. The only difference would be whether the
parties initially settled or otherwise resolved the breach of contract
action.
This scenario and the counter-example cited by the Lichon majority
both assume a case where the allegedly breaching party is the nonpleading party. Conversely, in a case where the allegedly breaching
party is the pleading party, he will almost always be able to exclude his
prior nolo contendere plea from a subsequent civil proceeding, even
under the construction offered in Schaeffer. Assume a situation where
one party prepays on a contract for the other party to deliver goods or
perform services, and the only party fails to deliver the goods or perform
the services. In this scenario, the non-breaching party would bring a
civil proceeding against the breaching party for breach of contract. If,
prior to the proceeding, the breaching party is charged with a crime such
as criminal fraud for activities relating to the contract, the non-breaching
party would not be able to introduce the plea into evidence because the
breaching party would be the civil defendant.
The Lichon dissent argued that it did not favor a construction of Rule
410 which aided the criminal defendant if he sought to profit from his
crime. These counter-examples prove, however, that the construction
offered in Schaeffer does little to further this public policy while
creating anomalous results. In a case where the pleading party is
allegedly not the party at fault and he brings a civil proceeding that is
not resolved before he pleads, Schaeffer's construction of Rule 410 does
ensure that his nolo contendere plea will be treated as an admission,
making it admissible against him. Conversely, in almost any other
factual scenario, the criminal defendant might be able to 'profit from his
crime' because he will be able to prevent the admission of his plea
against him in a civil proceeding.
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This begs the additional question of whether the apparent dichotomy
created by the Lichon dissent makes any logical sense. The Lichon
dissent argued that the public interest in preventing a criminal defendant
from being assisted in profiting from his crime through his nolo
contendere plea outweighs the public interest in the promotion of plea
bargaining. The other side of the coin would thus seem to be that the
public interest in the promotion of plea bargaining is not outweighed
when a criminal defendant does not seek to profit from his crime but
instead merely seeks to protect himself from future civil liability. But
what about the civil plaintiff in this scenario who cannot use the civil
defendant's prior nolo contendere plea?
Assume the factual scenario where an individual maliciously sets a
fire to his property, which leads to both his neighbor and his property
being severely burned. The criminal defendant, cognizant that a guilty
plea during his criminal trial for arson could be admitted against him in
a subsequent civil proceeding, pleads nolo contendere. The criminal
defendant's nolo contendere plea in this scenario would not assist him in
profiting from his crime, but would instead assist him in protecting
himself from future civil liability. Concurrently, however, the civil
plaintiff in this scenario would be handicapped in recovering for his
injuries based upon the civil defendant's crime. The Lichon dissent's
argument thus makes sense only if the public interest in preventing a
criminal defendant from profiting from his crimes is greater than the
public interest in assisting civil plaintiffs who seek to recover for their
injuries. If this dichotomy does not exist, then the Lichon dissent would
essentially be saying that other public interests always outweigh the
public interest in promoting plea bargaining that is promoted by
allowing nolo contendere pleas, which would be an argument against the
very existence of the nolo contendere plea.
Of course, this argument assumes that the pleading party actually
committed a crime or the crime to which he pleaded. While the
previously cited interviews conducted by Professor Stephanos Bibas
indicated that those is frequently the case, the interviewees also claimed
that some innocent defendants plead nolo contendere while others
defendants plead nolo contendere to charges for crimes more serious
than the ones they committed.22 7 The Lichon dissent's public policy
reasoning makes sense only if we assume that all criminal defendants
pleading nolo contendere are, in fact, guilty, because otherwise they
would have committed no crime from which they are seeking to

227. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 1377.
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profit.
Further, even if a court believes that the application of the Federal
Rules or corresponding state codes would lead to a result that violates
other public interests, the court's role is not to weigh these relative
interests from the bench. 2 9 Instead, such a result should be achieved by
making a formal amendment clearly establishing those situations in
which a party's prior nolo contendere plea can be used against him in a
subsequent civil proceeding.2 30
V. CONCLUSION

In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Walker v. Schaeffer reached the unprecedented decision that a civil
plaintiff is not entitled to the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence
410 and thus cannot prevent the admission of his prior nolo contendere
plea. Because the holding in Schaeffer regarding nolo contendere pleas
was technically dicta, however, legal scholarship has largely ignored this
novel holding. Conversely, courts at both the federal and state levels
have largely rubber stamped Schaeffer's holding and applied it in a
variety of factual contexts.
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation Federal Rule of Evidence 410,
however, was antithetical to the advisory committee's notes to its 1979
amendments, which plainly stated that the Rule was intended to protect
the pleading party in a subsequent proceeding, regardless of the type of
proceeding. The Sixth Circuit's claim that a prior nolo contendere plea
can be offered into evidence by a civil defendant for his own benefit
and that it is not offered against the civil plaintiff who previously made
the plea is similarly illogical given that the Federal Evidence require that
an admission be offered against a party-opponent. Furthermore, while
the Sixth Circuit's intent was to construe the Rule so that criminal
defendants are not aided in seeking to profit form their crimes, it instead
228. One could also imagine a scenario where a criminal defendant pleads nolo contendere to a
crime more serious than the one he committed, and yet he does not seek to profit from his crime through
a nolo contendere plea. For instance, under New York law, a criminal defendant could be guilty of
arson in the fourth degree because he recklessly damaged his house after intentionally starting a fire. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.05(1) (MeKinney 2006). Pursuant to a plea bargain, he might plead nolo

contendere to arson in the third degree, which requires that a defendant "intentionally damage[] a
building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an explosion. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.10(1)
(McKinney 2006). Assume that under his insurance policy covering his house, he is only prohibited
from recovering for fire damage if he intentionally damaged his property. By pleading nolo contendere,

the plaintiff would not be seeking to profit from his crime because his conduct would not prohibit him
from recovering under the insurance policy.
229. See Lichon, 459 N.W.2d at 297.

230. See id.
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created a strained interpretation that creates potentially anomalous
results. Consequently, courts should discontinue their unquestioning
adherence to Schaeffer and instead adhere to an interpretation of the
Federal Rules and corresponding state codes that coheres with the
advisory committee's notes to the 1979 amendments.
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